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Panel III: International Law,
Global Environmentalism, and
the Future of American.
Environmental Policy
Thomas W. Merrill, Third Panelist*
From an American perspective, environmental law has under-
gone two bouts of centralization in the past three decades. Round one
occurred in the 1970's, as Congress federalized vast areas of environ-
mental law that had previously been the province of state and local
governments. Round two, which is still in an incipient phase, repre-
sents the effort to internationalize environmental law.
The question I would like to address is what can we learn from
round one about what is likely to happen in round two.1 My answer,
in a nutshell, is that the primary driving force behind the federaliza-
tion of environmental law in the 1970's was a form of economic pro-
tectionism. The dominant motive for federalization was the desire to
protect existing industries, jobs, and tax bases against competition
from other states with potentially cheaper environmental regulations.
This suggests, in turn, that the most promising vehicle for globalizing
environmental law is the same type of protectionist impulse, operating
now on an international rather than an intranational scale. The trick
will be to harness this protectionist impulse toward proper environ-
mentalist ends without letting protectionism get out of control and
killing off trade liberalization altogether.
Let me begin with a clarification. I am not saying that environ-
mentalism is some kind of cover for economic protectionism. It could
be that some environmental initiatives are best explained on this basis.
But I readily concede that the sudden upsurge in public support for
environmental regulation that began in the 1970's and continues today
is a phenomenon that exists independently of any desire for economic
protectionism. My comments are directed at explaining not the fact of
environmentalism, but rather the centralizing tendency in environ-
mentalism. In other words, why does a demand for increased environ-
Copyright © 1994 by ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
* John Paul Stevens Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. For a different attempt to use the American experience to illuminate international
environmental issues, see Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Les-
sons From the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1329 (1992).
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mental protection translate into a demand for centralized controls,
rather than more rigorous local controls?
If we look at the legislative histories and public discussions that
surrounded the rapid federalization of American environmental law
in the 1970's, we can discern three prominent arguments in support of
centralization of controls: the spillover argument, the rights argument,
and the economic protectionism argument.2 Other justifications
played a role in the debate, but they were either too general to have
any impact on regulatory design, or else justified a federal role to only
a limited degree or only in special circumstances. Such justifications
can, consequently, be ignored for present purposes.
The spillover argument is in many respects the most obvious justi-
fication for federalization. Ozone from Chicago may affect air quality
in southern Wisconsin. 3 Pollution on the New York side of Lake
Champlain may affect persons on the Vermont side of the lake.4
These sorts of interstate spillovers are difficult, if not impossible, to
regulate under state or local law, since neither the polluting state nor
the receiving state has the correct incentives impartially to resolve the
dispute. Bringing in the Federal Government as a neutral arbiter that
represents the affected interests in both states seems like the logical
solution.
A second argument is the claim that individuals have a right to a
healthy environment. At first blush, it might seem that there is no
necessary connection between rights claims and the federalization of
environmental law. But claims of right tend by their very nature to-
ward universality. To say that there is a natural right to the fruits of
one's labor means that all persons everywhere have such a right. The
same holds true of the statement that torture violates human rights.
Thus, it should come as no surprise that when the environmental
movement adopted the rhetoric of rights and succeeded in attaching
this rhetoric to discussions of environmental policy, the political com-
munity naturally thought of those rights as attaching to the broadest
political jurisdiction capable of protecting them. In the case of the
United States in the 1970's, this was the Federal Government.
The third argument, economic protectionism, is based on the idea
of a regulatory race to the bottom among individual jurisdictions. The
assumption is that investment capital is mobile and will locate in the
2. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandat-
ing State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-19
(1977) (listing "the tragedy of the commons and national economies of scale," "disparities
in effective representation," "spillovers," and "moral ideals and the politics of sacrifice" as
the driving forces behind federalization in environmental policy).
3. See Wisconsin v. Thomas, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,964, 20,964 (E.D.
Wis. Jan. 18, 1989).
4. See International Paper Co. v. Ouelette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
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jurisdiction with the lowest total costs of production, thereby maxi-
mizing returns to investment. Knowing this, individual states will be
reluctant to enact tough environmental standards, even if their citi-
zens want them, because the associated rise in production costs may
drive investment capital-and hence jobs and the tax base-to other
jurisdictions. Fear of this flight of capital thus impels states into a race
to the bottom (i.e., the adoption of standards more lenient than their
citizens would prefer). The only way out of the dilemma is to impose
the tough standards at the federal level and, thereby, eliminate any
incentive to shift capital from one jurisdiction to another. Both the
theoretical and empirical assumptions of the race to the bottom thesis
have been called into question in recent years,5 but there can be no
doubt that the notion was widely believed in the 1970's, and still car-
ries great weight today.
These three arguments for federalization of environmental law
have very different implications for the type of regulatory regime one
would expect to be adopted as a matter of federal law. Stated suc-
cinctly, the spillover argument would generate a regime that focuses
on interstate pollution, the rights argument would generate a regime
that tries to equalize environmental quality across jurisdictions, and
the economic protection argument would generate a regime that tries
to equalize environmental compliance costs across jurisdictions. It
follows that one can draw some inferences about which of these three
arguments carried the most weight in the 1970's by examining the na-
ture of the legislation that emerged from Congress: Was it primarily
designed to redress interstate spillovers? to equalize environmental
quality across jurisdictions? or to equalize environmental compliance
costs across jurisdictions?
The spillover rationale may be rather easily eliminated on this
basis. If spillover effects were the dominant reason for the adoption
of federal environmental laws, federal law would concentrate on envi-
ronmental media with the greatest potential for crossboundary pollu-
tion. This would primarily be air pollution, especially from sources
located near state lines, and water pollution associated with interstate
waters. In addition, one would expect federal environmental legisla-
tion to contain well-defined mechanisms for resolving disputes that
arise over interstate pollution.
The federal legislation that was adopted, however, contains little
to suggest that interstate spillovers were a dominant, or even signifi-
5. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
"Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210 (1992) (concluding that race to the bottom has no valid theoretical basis in environ-
mental law); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitive-
ness, 102 YALE L. J. 2039 (1993) (questioning empirical basis for the theory).
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cant, focus of concern. Neither the Clean Air Act (CAA) 6 nor the
Clean Water Act (CWA) 7 are limited to, or even give special attention
to, sources likely to generate interstate conflicts. Instead, the empha-
sis is on uniform standards for point sources, especially new or modi-
fied point sources, regardless of whether they pose a danger of
interstate pollution. Statutes like RCRA,8 CERCLA 9, and the Safe
Drinking Water Act 10 are primarily concerned with ground water con-
tamination and other localized harms, rather than transboundary pol-
lutants. The same may be said of federal provisions governing oil
spills," impairment of visibility, 12 and surface mining blight,13-since
these are nearly always confined to a single political jurisdiction. Per-
haps even more tellingly, none of the original federal'acts contained
an effective mechanism for dealing with interstate pollution. In the
Clean Air Act, for example, Congress has never provided an effective
remedy for downwind states complaining of pollution from upwind
states.14
What, then, about the idea that there is a right to a healthy envi-
ronment, accompanied by the unspoken assumption that protected
rights are federal rights? If this were the dominant concern, one
would expect to find regulatory regimes that seek to equalize the ben-
efits to citizens across jurisdictions. Some evidence of such an equal-
benefits policy exists in the major statutes of the 1970's. The national
ambient air quality standards of the Clean Air Act provide the most
prominent example. 15 As originally enacted, the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970 seemed to contemplate that federal regulation
would by 1977 produce uniformly healthy and pristine air for all
Americans, wherever they might live.16 Similarly, the 1972 Clean
Water Act set forth a goal of fishable and swimmable waters through-
out the United States by 1983.17 Both mandates are exactly what one
would expect from a rights perspective.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
8. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988
& Supp. IV 1992).
9. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1988).
11. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. IV 1992).
12. CAA §§ 169A-169B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7491-7492.
13. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992).
14. See New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
15. CAA § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
16. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 110(a)(2)(A), 84 Stat. 1676, 1680 (1970) (amended 1990).
17. CWA § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
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Even more striking are some federal environmental statutes that
make no sense from any perspective other than the rights justification.
Take the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act.18 This Act cannot be justi-
fied on interstate spillover grounds, since virtually all public water sys-
tems are confined to a single local political jurisdiction. Nor can the
Act plausibly be justified on a race to the bottom theory, which as-
sumes expensive environmental controls may induce industrial
sources to close and move elsewhere. Although public water systems
might shut down, they are obviously in no danger of relocating to an-
other jurisdiction. The only satisfactory justification for federalizing
drinking water quality standards is some notion that all Americans
have a right to safe and clean drinking water, and thus that there
"oughta be law" at the federal level protecting this right.
Over time, however, the influence of rights claims on the design
of the federal environmental laws appears to have faded. The Clean
Air Act, for example, has evolved into a kind of de facto triage sys-
tem, with cleaner-than-national standards or Prevention of Significant
Deterioration areas, compliance areas, and dirtier-than-national stan-
dards or nonattainment areas. This variation in air quality areas is
recognized as a more or less permanent state of affairs. 19 The Clean
Water Act never transformed its lofty fishable-swimmable water goal
into reality, but instead concentrated on technology-based permitting
standards for point sources of water pollution, determined with little
regard to impact on water quality.20 Even the Safe Drinking Water
Act has devolved into a system of state enforcement of federal stan-
dards, which in practice permits significant local variation.21 Other
federal statutes, ranging from RCRA to NEPA22 to TSCA,23 set con-
trols based on considerations of feasibility, or available alternatives, or
costs and benefits, and thus eschew any notion of a universal right to a
given measure of environmental protection.
Only when we turn to the third justification-the economic pro-
tectionist rationale-do we see significant congruence between justifi-
catory theory and regulatory design. As noted, the regulatory strategy
one would expect under a race to the bottom justification would be an
attempt to equalize compliance costs across jurisdictions. Only if
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1988).
19. For example, the 1990 Amendments to the CAA extend compliance dates for
attainment in some cases to the year 2010. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) (Table 1).
20. See William F. Pederson, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q.
69 (1988).
21. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE
AND POLICY 978-79 (1992).
22. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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compliance costs are equalized will decisions about future capital in-
vestment be neutralized with respect to environmental regulation.
Owners of capital may still decide to leave Cleveland or Detroit and
move to South Carolina, but the decision will be based on factors like
wages, unions, local taxes, or the weather, not on the strength or
weakness of local environmental controls.
Considerable evidence suggests that equalization of compliance
costs is indeed a central concern of federal environmental laws. First,
there is what might be called the up-down distinction. Virtually all
federal environmental statutes permit the states to adopt regulations
that are more stringent than the federal standards, but expressly pro-
hibit the states from adopting standards that are less stringent. 24 In
effect, the federal statutes create an environmental floor, but not a
ceiling.25 The up-down distinction is precisely what one would expect
if federal law were driven by a concern with a state race to the bottom.
States cannot be permitted to deviate downward from federal stan-
dards because they might start competing for mobile capital. The pos-
sibility of a race to the top is a matter of indifference.
Second, there is the new-old distinction. Throughout environ-
mental law, we find that new sources of pollution are regulated more
strictly than existing sources. 26 Uniform federal stationary source and
mobile source standards under the Clean Air Act apply only to new
sources, not to existing sources.27 Tougher standards are mandated by
the Clean Water Act for new point sources than for existing sources.28
New food additives, drugs, chemicals, and pesticides are subjected to a
rigid regulatory screening process, while previously marketed sub-
stances are subject to more lenient standards or enjoy "grandfather"
protection.29 Various justifications for the new-old distinction have
been offered. But one explanation is surely a desire to ensure that the
allocation of decisions about capital investment with respect to new
sources or products are not influenced by differential environmental
compliance costs across jurisdictions.
24. See, e.g., CAA § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416; CWA § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
25. There are a few examples of federal statutes that preempt state regulation alto-
gether. See, e.g., CAA § 209(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (motor vehicles); Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) § 24(b), 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988) (labeling and
packaging of pesticides); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) § 18(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2617(a)(2) (manufacturing of toxic chemicals). But these provisions are the exceptions,
rather than the rule, and are essentially confined to circumstances where particular prod-
ucts that are distributed nationally would otherwise be subject to multiple and conflicting
regulatory standards.
26. See generally Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L.
REV. 1025 (1983) (offering examples and criticizing the distinction).
27. See, e.g., CAA §§ 111, 202, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7521.
28. See CWA § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316.
29. See Huber, supra note 26.
[Vol. 21:475
1994] PANEL III: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 491
Third, and perhaps most importantly, is the overriding concern in
federal statutes with uniform technology-based standards for indus-
trial sources of pollution, as opposed to incentives that would modify
inputs used by these sources or demand for the products they pro-
duce. The Clean Water Act, for example, is almost wholly concerned
with "point sources," and makes little effort to control nonpoint
sources, even though such sources are universally acknowledged to be
important contributors to ambient water pollution.30 Similarly,
RCRA focuses its regulatory firepower on hazardous waste disposal
facilities, and does little directly to modify the waste-generating habits
of individuals or firms. 31 The Clean Air Act, which seems on its face
to make everything turn on ambient air quality standards, in its ad-
ministration and implementation turns out to be largely a regulator of
stationary sources. Even the mobile source provisions are driven
largely by compliance cost equalization. The major strategy for deal-
ing with mobile source pollution is to impose nationally uniform
tailpipe emissions standards, which has the effect of equalizing com-
pliance costs for both manufacturers and users of autos.
I conclude, therefore, that the foremost factor driving the federal-
ization of environmental law is the desire to protect existing shares of
industrial output, jobs, and tax revenues. A secondary factor is the
belief by many that there should be a right to a healthy environment,
and the concomitant assumption that this means federal rather than
state or local protection. Concerns with redressing interstate spil-
lovers, while perhaps rhetorically important in justifying federaliza-
tion, take up a distant third place in the actual design of these statutes,
and hence should not be regarded as an important driving force.
What are the implications of this analysis in terms of the second
round in centralization-the emerging trend toward globalization of
environmental regulation? First, the analysis suggests that a concern
over transboundary pollution is unlikely to generate significant sup-
port for new forms of international environmental law. I am not en-
tirely sure why this should be so. Perhaps it reflects the fact that
pollution is still largely a local phenomenon, and that instances of
transboundary pollution are too episodic or do not generate sufficient
harm to the affected states to generate widespread interest in an inter-
national solution. Perhaps it reflects the fact that the extreme asym-
metry between the costs and benefits of controls in these cases make
an international solution very difficult to attain, and one that few are
willing to commit to in advance.
30. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 21, at 945.
31. Id. at 417-20.
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Second, the American experience suggests that the rights per-
spective is unlikely to generate a strong commitment to an enforcea-
ble regime of international environmental law, at least not in the near-
term. To be sure, the idea that people have a right to a healthy envi-
ronment is spreading throughout the world. The idea has great appeal
in the recently liberated nations of Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, which have witnessed immense environmental devasta-
tion. The idea also seems to be catching hold in many parts of the
developing world, where one might expect citizens to prefer rapid eco-
nomic growth to environmental amenities. But even if the right to a
healthy environment is an idea whose time has arrived, there is little
evidence that individuals around the world regard the global commu-
nity as the proper locus for protection of these rights. No doubt there
has been some movement in this direction, as the universalization of
claims of human rights attests. But we are still some way from the day
when most individuals around the world think of the United Nations,
as opposed to individual nation states, as the appropriate entity to se-
cure the protection of individual rights. Until that day arrives, the
idea of environmental rights is unlikely to supply the motive force
necessary to complete the drive toward a second round in the centrali-
zation of environmental law.
Third, to the extent that we see real movement in international
environmental law, it is likely to be in response to a demand for eco-
nomic protectionism. Federalization of environmental law in the
1970's took place largely in response to fears that industry would flee
to areas with cheaper environmental regulation. Similarly, the inter-
nationalization of environmental law is most likely to occur as part of
an effort to head off the flight of industry to "pollution havens." The
only difference is that this time the centralization of standards will
occur not through recourse to a sovereign central government, but
through bilateral and multilateral negotiations that take place in con-
junction with trade liberalization.
In short, the experience with the federalization of environmental
law in the United States in the 1970's suggests that future centraliza-
tion of environmental law is more likely to occur as an adjunct to
trade law than in the form of freestanding multinational environmen-
tal treaties. The dominant model for the global environmental future
will not be the freestanding treaty on environmental concerns, such as
the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depletion,32 where the nations of the
world gather to agree upon common measures to address a global
commons-type problem. The American experience would suggest
32. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
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that the Montreal Protocol was an aberration, explainable in part by
the fact that an international treaty banning CFC production was con-
sistent with the economic interests of the dominant chemical compa-
nies of the West.33 Instead, the dominant model of the future is
NAFTA, 34 with its efforts to standardize American and Mexican envi-
ronmental law in order to forestall a flight of U.S. industry to the
South.
This general prediction has both negative and positive implica-
tions for the global environmental future. On the negative side, it sug-
gests that any regime for dealing with a problem of the global
commons-such as the greenhouse effect-will, if it emerges at all, be
highly inefficient. An optimal regulatory strategy for dealing with
global commons problems would seek to internalize the costs that ac-
tors in different jurisdictions impose on the commons. With respect to
global warming, for example, such a strategy might focus on reduc-
tions in emissions of greenhouse gases in some countries, on reduc-
tions in carbon fuel consumption in others, and on forbearance from
destroying gas-absorbing forests in still others. Under such a regime,
compliance costs would vary with the degree of damage each jurisdic-
tion imposes on common resources. The regime that is more likely to
gather political support, however, is one that tends toward the imposi-
tion of uniform compliance costs, regardless of the impact on environ-
mental media. Such a regime might insist, for example, on the use of
standardized emission-controlling devices everywhere. This outcome
would have some mitigating effect on global warming, but not nearly
as much as would a more finely tuned strategy that mixes and matches
regulations depending on each country's individual circumstances.
On the positive side, there are two points to be made. First, the
American example suggests that there is at least one institutional
force-fear of a race to the bottom-with the potential to evolve into
a genuine form of international environmental law. The experience of
the European Union corroborates this. The Europeans moved toward
harmonization of environmental standards in the 1970's and 1980's, in
large part to eliminate incentives for industrial relocation within the
EU caused by disparate environmental regulations. Over time, how-
ever, community-enforced environmental protection became some-
thing of an end in itself.35 Although protectionist impulses may still
supply the bulk of the political support for a regime of European-wide
33. See Daniel F. Mclnnis, Ozone Layers and Oligopoly Profits, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr., eds.,
1992).
34. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605.
35. See Philippe Sands, European Community Environmental Law: The Evolution of
a Regional Regime of International Environmental Protection, 100 YALE L.J. 2511, 2513-18
(1991).
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environmental controls, the institutionalization of centralized controls
may also create a mechanism for tackling spillover and commons
problems, which otherwise would go begging for a solution.
The second positive point has to do with concerns about global
equity and the fairness of demanding that Third World nations adopt
strict provisions to protect the environment when they have not yet
had a chance to enjoy the fruits of industrialization. If I am correct
that the movement toward globalization is likely to take place primar-
ily in the context of bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations, then
this suggests a built-in mechanism for dealing with the equity problem.
Specifically, the more developmentally advanced nations will be able
to induce the developing nations to adopt regimes that call for stricter
environmental protection only by offering them greater access to mar-
kets in the developed world. In effect, trade liberalization will act as
implicit compensation for agreeing to stricter environmental stan-
dards. This implicit compensation goes a long way toward offsetting
the complaint that globalization of stricter environmental norms is un-
fair to the Third World.
In sum, my advice to environmentalists would not be, as one com-
mentator recently said, to "end their alliance with protectionists. ' 36
Environmentalists, if they are to produce a genuine regime of interna-
tional environmental law, desperately need the protectionists. The
trick for the environmentalists will be to harness protectionist anxiety
by imposing environmental conditions on trade liberalization agree-
ments, without letting the anxiety get out of hand and killing off these
agreements altogether. As the NAFTA experience suggests, walking
this tightrope is not going to be easy.
36. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the Environ-
ment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 700, 727 (1992).
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